Foundations of Political Economy
In this project, we examine the foundations of political competition and social choice. In particular, we are concerned with the following issues:
- How do costs of change affect political competition?
- Is public information desirable in social choices?
- How is political competition affected by two-dimensional informational asymmetries regarding the preferences and competence of candidates?
- How does non-informative advertising (money burning) impact on political signalling games?
- How should political campaigns be regulated?
Publications
- Elections, the Curse of Competence and Credence Policies, Public Choice, 2020, 1-21.
(Hans Gersbach)
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- Channeling the Final Say in Politics, Economic Theory, 2019, 1-33.
(Hans Gersbach, Stephan Imhof and Oriol Tejada)
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- A Reform Dilemma in Polarized Democracies, Journal of Public Economics, 160, 2018, 148-158.
(Hans Gersbach and Oriol Tejada)
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- Campaigns, Political Mobility and Communication, Public Choice, 161(1), 2014, 31-49.
(Hans Gersbach)
Download Working Paper Version - Tax Rules, Social Choice and Welfare, 41, 2012, 19-42.
(Hans Gersbach, Volker Hahn, and Stephan Imhof)
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- Information Acquisition and Transparency in Committees, International Journal of Game Theory, 41, 2012, 427-453.
(Hans Gersbach and Volker Hahn)
Download Working Paper Version (PDF, 394 KB) - Why One-Person-One-Vote?, Social Choice and Welfare 23(3), 2004, 449-464.
Download Working Paper Version (PDF, 222 KB)
- The Money-Burning Refinement in a Political Signalling Game, International Journal of Game Theory, 33, 2004, 67-87.
(Hans Gersbach)
Download Working Paper Version (PDF, 157 KB) - Size and Distributional Uncertainty, Public Information and the Information Paradox, Social Choice and Welfare, 17, 2000, 241-246.
(Hans Gersbach)
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- Public Information and Social Choice, Social Choice and Welfare, 17, 2000, 25-31.
(Hans Gersbach)
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Working Papers
- Download The Optimal Length of Political Terms (PDF, 788 KB)
(Hans Gersbach, Matthew Jackson, and Oriol Tejada) - external page Politsplaining: Populism Breeds Populism
(Hans Gersbach and Laurin Köhler-Schindler) - external page Open Rule Legislative Bargaining
(Hans Gersbach and Volker Britz) - Download A Dynamic Model of Electoral Competition with Costly Policy Changes
(Hans Gersbach, Matthew Jackson, Philippe Muller, and Oriol Tejada)
- Download Cake Division by Majority Decision
(Hans Gersbach and Bernhard Pachl)
Team Members
Cooperation Partner
- external page Matthew Jackson (Stanford)