Monetary Policy, Banking and Financial Stability
Should the ECB publish its minutes?
Authors: Hans Gersbach and Volker Hahn
external pageVoxEU articlecall_made
Date posted: October 7, 2013
Abstract:
The publication of attributed voting records and minutes of the ECB council’s meetings would increase the influence of national governments and discourage pro-Eurozone behaviour. This column argues that this would be undesirable. Publishing non-attributed summary minutes, however, would enhance the ECB’s accountability towards the public.
True independence for the ECB: Triggering power - no more, no less
Authors: Markus K Brunnermeier and Hans Gersbach
external pageVoxEU articlecall_made
Date posted: December 20, 2012
Abstract:
As governments and the EU wring their hands over banking reform, a fragile system remains in place. This column argues that the ECB’s current role undermines its independence. What the Eurozone needs to reduce undue forbearance - while preserving the ECB's independence - is a ‘diarchy’ in which both a newly built Restructuring Authority and the ECB have the power to trigger bank-restructuring.
A framework for two macro policy instruments: Money and banking combined
Author: Hans Gersbach
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Date posted: October, 2011
Abstract:
The way in which monetary policy, macroprudential policy, and microprudential regulation of banks should be organised and conducted is a major, as yet unresolved, issue. In CEPR Policy Insight No. 58, the author outlines a policy framework for addressing this issue.
Money and banking – realigned efficiently
Author: Hans Gersbach
external pageVoxEU articlecall_made
Date posted: October 12, 2011
Abstract:
Current macroeconomic policymaking suffers from an inadequate range of instruments and the absence of a comprehensive assignment of responsibilities. This column introduces a new CEPR Policy Insight designed to remedy these shortcomings. It proposes a framework for monetary, macroprudential, and microprudential policies.
Banking on the average: A new way to regulate banks
Author: Hans Gersbach
external pageVoxEU articlecall_made
Date posted: September 7, 2011
Abstract:
Current regulation imposes fixed capital requirements on banks. However, this makes it impossible to use regulatory capital as a buffer against negative macroeconomic shocks. This column explains how this paradox could be resolved by basing capital requirements each year on average bank equity capital in the industry.
Crisis contracts
Author: Hans Gersbach
external pageVoxEU articlecall_made
Date posted: April 2, 2011
Abstract:
When banks failed, the government paid up. But the bankers responsible kept their bonuses from the years of excess. This column argues for “crisis contracts”. Such contracts require that, in the event of a crisis, bank managers forfeit a portion of their past earnings to rescue the banking system.
Krisenverträge – Eckpfeiler einer neuen Finanzarchitektur
Author: Hans Gersbach
external pageÖkonomenstimme articlecall_made
Date posted: March 22, 2010
Abstract:
In diesem Beitrag stellen wir mit Krisenverträgen eine Massnahme vor, welche das Spektrum der bereits vorliegenden Vorschläge erweitert, und die eine Alternative zu direkten Eingriffen in das Marktgeschehen auf den Finanzmärkten darstellt.
Double targeting for Central Banks with two instruments: Interest rates and aggregate bank equity
Author: Hans Gersbach
external pageVoxEU articlecall_made
Date posted: February 1, 2010
Abstract:
Should monetary policy and banking regulation be conducted by separate bodies? This column proposes a new policy framework whereby the central bank chooses short–term interest rates and the aggregate equity ratio while banking regulation and supervision, including the determination of bank–specific capital requirements, would be left to separate bank–regulatory authorities.
Inflation targeting and bank equity rules: Parallels and lessons
Authors: Hans Gersbach and Volker Hahn
external pageVoxEU articlecall_made
Date posted: October 21, 2009
Abstract:
This column suggests that there are surprising parallels between inflation targeting and bank capital requirements. It shows they could inform each other.
Insurance against systemic crises: The real contract between society and banks
Author: Hans Gersbach
external pageVoxEU articlecall_made
Date posted: August 8, 2009
Abstract:
The crisis is a brutal reminder of the fragility of banks. This column suggests that managers of large banks be obliged to purchase insurance against systemic crises. This would create incentives for them to be concerned about the stability of the banking system as a whole.
Contingent Contracts – Insurance against Banking Crises?
Author: Hans Gersbach
external pageVoxEU articlecall_made
Date posted: February 5, 2009
Abstract:
Deposit, loan, or other contracts in banking, that are made contingent on macroeconomic events or aggregate bank capital, could reduce or even eliminate the occurrence of banking crises, as the private sector can insure an economy against such meltdowns. However, this will only have prospects of success if a number of preconditions are met, such as limitations of broad government bailouts. Otherwise, the likelyhood and severity of banking crises may even increase.